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102 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW 
EVIDENCE-DIRECTED VERDICTS-INFERENCES FROM 
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
In Nebraska a directed verdicts based on circumstantial evi-
dence leading to an inference presents a difficult problem. Even 
the Supreme Court of the United States has hedged when called 
upon to formulate a rule to help guide trial judges in federal 
courts when they are considering what degree of circumstantial 
evidence is needed to allow a case to go to the jury. The court 
stated " ... the essential requirement is that mere speculation be 
not allowed to do duty for probative facts, after making due al-
lowance for all reasonably possible inferences favoring the party 
whose case is attacked." The majority of the Court in refusing 
$0 Sinclair v. United States, 2H U.S. 263 (1928). 
$1 The author has gone through all available records on the investiga-
tions of the colleges. With the exception of a few cases, all the pro-
fessors were represented by counsel. Frequently, the witness has pre-
pared a statement before he got to the committee. In order to do this 
he must have had sufficient time to confer with his counsel. Also, after 
each question was asked, the witness was allowed ample time to confer 
with his lawyer before he answered the question. 
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to adopt a general rule concluded that the problem is one that 
must be solved in particular situations.1 
The decision is ably criticized by Professor McBaine. He 
agrees with the Court's conclusion that the terms "substantial 
evidence," "some evidence," and "any evidence" are insufficient 
tests because they are too vague and indefinite. He concludes, 
however, that the problem was not solved when the Supreme 
Court said that the evidence needed to send the case to the jury 
must rise above "mere speculation" or that a different standard 
must be used in each case.2 
The Nebraska cases considering the problem of a directed 
verdict hold that a verdict for the defendant is properly directed 
where the testimony affords no basis for recovery in favor of the 
plaintiff ;3 or where there is an entire failure of proof to sustain 
the plaintiff's material allegations ;4 or where no other verdict is 
possible unqer the evidence ;0 or where there is no evidence before 
the jury on material issues in favor of the plaintiff (or party 
holding the affirmative) ;6 or where it would be the court's duty 
to set aside a different verdict if rendered.7 The Nebraska Su-
preme Court has also held that where there is some evidence sup-
porting the affirmative side of a case,8 the case cannot be taken 
1 Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943). 
2 McBaine, Trial Practice: Directed Verdicts Federal Rule, 31 Calif. 
L. Rev. 454 (1943). 
3 Dramse v. Modern Woodmen of America, 102 Neb. 615, 168 N.W. 
358 (1918); Pollock Y. Pearson, 101 Neb. 284, 163 N.W. 329 (1917); 
Cady v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 93 Neb. 634, 142 N.W. 107 (1913); Sellers 
v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry .. 87 Neb. 322, 127 N.W. 125 (1910); Ogden v. 
Sovereign Camp of Woodmen of the 'Vorld, 84 Neb. 666, 121 N.W. 973 
(1909); Holdrege v. Watson, 1 Neb. (Unofficial) 687, 96 N.W. 67 {1901). 
4 Keckler v. Modern Brotherhood of America, 77 Neb. 301, 109 N.W. 
157 (1906). 
o Nebraska Transfer Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 90 Neb. 488, 134 
N.W. 163 (1912). 
6 Burke v. First Nat. Bank of Pender, 61 Neb. 20, 84 N.W. 408 (1900). 
7 Halsted v. Shackelton, 98 Neb. 13, 151 N.W. 954 (1915); Joseph v. 
Cudahy Packing Co., 95 Neb. 397, 145 N.W. 987 (1914); Ward v. Aetna 
Life Ins. Co., 91 Neb. 52, 135 N.W. 220 (1912) . 
. s Authorities say that there are two possible tests that can be used 
to determine the power of a judge to direct a verdict. One gives the 
judge maximum control; the other test grants the least control that can 
be given to the judge without allowing the jury to disregard substantive 
law. In the former test the judge looks at all the evidence and then asks 
himself whether if the jury returned a verdict, he would be duty bound 
to set it aside. The second test compels the judge to consider only evi-
dence favorable to the proponent. If. when viewing that evidence in its 
most favorable light, he finds every fact exists, he then must let the jury 
decide the case. :McBaine, Trial Practice: Directed Verdicts Federal Rule, 
31 Calif. L. Rev. 454 (1943). 
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from the jury and a verdict directed for the defendant.0 
However, in considering cases in which the plaintiff relies 
solely upon circumstantial evidence to support his case, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court has attempted to set up a standard which 
is higher than "merely some evidence." Two recent Nebraska 
cases give some indication as to what this standard may be. 
In Koutsky v. Boioman10 the plaintiff, the owner of a lot, 
sued an adjacent lot owner and an excavation company for piling 
dirt against his building. At the trial the plaintiff was unable 
to present direct evidence that the defendant excavation company 
piled dirt against his building. The plaintiff did present evidence 
that the defendant property owner gave the company an exclusive 
contract to dump dirt on his property. The company dumped 
some dirt but not against plaintiff's building. After the plaintiff 
warned the company not to dump any more dirt, the company 
stopped. However, someone had dumped some dirt against plain-
tiff's building. There had been a continuous procession of trucks 
from the company's loading area which had been moving in the 
general direction of the plaintiff's property the day the alleged 
incident occured. A trail of dirt led from the company's loading 
area to the property the company was filling. The trial court 
sustained the company's motion to dismiss for "want of evidence." 
In reversing the lower court the Supreme Court said: 
... The plaintiffs as against a motion for a directed verdict ... 
are entitled to have every controverted fact resolved in their 
favor and to have the benefit of every inference that can be rea-
sonably deduced from the evidence.11 
In Shamblen v. Great Lakes Pipe Line Co.,12 decided in the 
same term, the plaintiff alleged that a truck from the defendant 
company was responsible for destroying an overhead powerline 
that supplied the plaintiff with power. The plaintiff was unable 
to present direct evidence that an agent of the defendant had 
torn down the power lines. The defendant introduced evidence 
that the agent of defendant had come on the plaintiff's land and 
laid out stakes to aid in construction of the pipeline. The de-
fendant company's truck had been on the plaintiff's property just 
t• Haight v. Nelson, 157 Neb. 641, 59 N.W.2d 576 (1953); Gunn v. 
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 154 Neb. 150, 47 N.W.2d 397 (1951); Schmidbauer 
v. Omaha & C.B. St. Ry., 104 Neb. 250, 177 N.W. 336 (1920); Allen v. 
Cerny, 68 Neb. 211, 94 N.W. 151 (1903); Rogers v. Kansas City & Omaha 
Ry., 52 Neb. 86, 71 N."\V. 977 (1897). 
10 157 Neb. 919, 62 N.W.2d 114 (1954). 
11 Id. at 921. 
I:! 158 Neb. 752, 64 N.W.2d 728 (1954). 
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prior to the alleged incident. The truck that tore down the lines 
followed the path of the stakes, turned around, and drove out. 
The plaintiff heard the truck drive on his land but did not investi-
gate because he though it was "just a truck from the pipeline 
company." The lower court found for the plaintiff and on ap-
peal the Supreme Court reversed, maintaining that the trial judge 
should have sustained the several defense motions that the plain-
tiff had not sustained his case. The court stated the proposition 
that was the basis for the holding in the Koutsky case but then 
went on to say: 
When several inferences are deducible from facts presented, which 
inferences are opposed to each other but equally consistent with 
the facts proved, the plaintiff does not sustain his position by 
reliance alone on an inference which would entitle him to recover. 
It is patent that this evidence is clearly insufficient to sustain a 
finding that a truck for which the defendant was responsible 
entered the plaintiff's property, struck the power line and tore 
it down. The plaintiff's evidence is solely one of suspicion and 
conjecture. The trial court erred .... 13 
If the Supreme Court had not been reversing the lower court, 
the decision in both cases might be attributed to two factors. It 
might be argued that the court would not reverse because of mere 
difference of opinion between the Supreme Court and the trial 
judge or jury regarding the weight and sufficiency of evidence.11 
Or it could be argued that because the trial court had an oppor-
tunity to see and hear the witnesses, the Supreme Court must ac-
cept the trial court's decision on the credibility of evidence.1u 
But because the cases were reversed they should act as a guide 
to determine the burden of proof the plaintiff must meet to get 
the case to the jury when he relies on circumstantial evidence. 
In the Koutsky case the court said in effect that there was 
only one reasonable inference that could be drawn from the facts. 
In the Shamblen case the court stated that there were several 
equally consisted inferences that could be drawn from the facts 
and therefore merely because one of the inferences which could 
have been drawn supported the plaintiff's case, the circumstantial 
evidence was not sufficient to send the case to the jury. The 
court did not say that the inferences were reasonable, or that one 
inference was more reasonable than the others. The implication 
in the case is that a reasonable inference may be presented by 
13 Id. at 755, 756. 
141\Iissouri Pac. Ry. v. Palmer, 55 Neb. 559, 76 N.W. 169 (1898); City 
of Harvard v. Crouch, 47 Neb. 133, 66 N.W. 276 (1896). 
lo Teresi v. Filley, 146 Neb. 797, 21 N.W.2d 699 (1946). 
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the plaintiff; but if any other reasonable inference can be drawn 
than the inference which supports the plaintiff's case, the plain-
tiff's inference ceases to be a reasonable inference, and his cir-
cumstantial evidence merely reaches the standard of suspicion 
and conjecture. 
The problem is further illustrated by Bedford v. Herman a 
recent case involving tort-liability in a head-on highway collision. 
The plaintiff owned a refrigerator tractor and the defendant 
owned a gasoline transport. There was no evidence that either 
vehicle crossed the center line, but evidence was presented that the 
defendant was as close as four inches according to tire marks, 
while the plaintiff did not come any closer than nine to twelve 
inches. In the collision the plaintiff's left drive wheels con-
nected with the tandem wheels to the rear of the defendant's 
transport.16 In sustaining the district court's directed verdict 
for defendant, the court said: 
In order for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to require 
the submission of the issue of negligence to a jury it must be 
such that a reasonable inference of negligence arises from the 
circumstances established. If such evidence is susceptible to any 
other reasonable inference, inconsistent with the inference of neg-
ligence on the party charged, it is insufficient to carry the case 
to the jury.11 
In a civil action the plaintiff has the burden of proving his 
case by a preponderance of the evidence.18 In a criminal case the 
guilt of the defendant must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.19 
In the Shamblen and the Bedford cases the plaintiff did not sus-
tain the burden necessary to get to the jury by presenting area-
sonable inference that supported his case, but he was required to 
present a reasonable inference that excluded every other reason-
able inference. By indirection this placed upon the plaintiff the 
duty of sustaining his case "beyond a reasonable doubt" and not 
merely by a preponderance of evidence. Whenever a plaintiff re-
lies on circumstantial evidence in a civil action, it would seem that 
he has to meet the criminal law burden of proof. 
16158 Neb. 400, 62 N.W.2d 772 (1954). 
17 Id. at 403. 
is The plaintiff must prove all material allegations of his case by a 
preponderance of evidence; if he fails to establish any one allegation by a 
preponderance, a verdict should be for the defendant. Danner v. Walters, 
154 Neb. 506, 48 N.W.2d 635 (1951); Kristifek v. Rapp, 154 Neb. 343, 
47 N.W.2d 923 (1951); Altshuler v. Coburn, 38 Neb. 881, 57 N.W. 836 
(1894). 
1fl Bourne v. State, 116 Neb. 141, 216 N.W. 173 (1927). The rule is 
discussed in Underhill's Criminal Evidence § 17 (4th ed. 1935). 
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There has always been much controversy, some of which 
may be traced to sentimentality about conviction of crime and 
capital punishment upon circumstantial evidence, as to the rela-
tive probative value of "direct" and of "circumstantial" evidence.20 
Some authorities maintain that it is wrong to place an arbitrary 
value on either type of evidence. If the probative value out-
weighs the risk that its admission will create a substantial danger 
of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the 
jury, then, they argue, it should be admitted.21 
In the Koutsky, Shamblen, and Bedford cases the Nebraska 
Supreme Court by requiring the circumstantial evidence to create 
an inference that excludes every other inference places a greater 
burden on a plaintiff who depends on circumstantial evidence 
than on a plaintiff who depends upon direct evidence. The dif-
ference in treatment of the two does not seem justified. 
The Nebraska Supreme Court has held that in a probate pro-
ceeding it was not error to let the jury decide which of two rea-
sonable inferences to accept. In the case of In re Far-r's Estate22 
a will was contested by the plaintiff and the jury found for the 
plaintiff, relying principally on the plaintiff's circumstantial evi-
dence that the defendant used undue influence. The trial court 
refused to give the jury the following instruction: 
You are further instructed that if you can reasonably draw con-
trary or opposing inferences from the facts as you find them on 
the evidence, one inference which might lead to the supposition 
of undue influence and a contr_ary inference that no undue in-
fluence was exerted by ... fthe proponent] your verdict should 
be for the proponent.23 
The Supreme Court recognized the issue raised by the de-
fendant on appeal but answered it by saying: 
The substantial contention ... is that ... if they ... [the jury] 
... could reasonably infer that there was undue influence and 
they could infer there was not that they were required to accept 
the latter and reject the former inference ..• 
. . . It is made clear by these cases that in a case where a will is 
being contested on the ground of undue influence the contestant 
is entitled to have considered by the jury all evidence and all in-
20 See Jones, Commentaries on Evidence 16-23 (1926). 
21 The probative value v. risk rule is stated in the Model Code of Evi-
dence, Rule 303 (1942). An excellent discussion of the relative value 
which should be given real and circumstantial evidence is found in A.L.I .. 
Basic Problems in Evidence 160-190 (1954). 
22150 Neb. 615, 35 N.W.2d 489 (1949). 
23 Id. at 618. 
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ferences reasonably to be drawn from the evidence. We think 
this should be the proper and accepted rule. 
To hold that a hypothesis or inference that there was no undue 
influence is sufficient to defeat a contest of a will on the ground 
of undue influence would be to deny to a contestant the right 
to have his evidence weighed in its own light and in the light 
of reasonable inferences to be drawn from it.24' 
The court recognized strong policy factors against requiring 
the plaintiff to present an inference that excludes all other reason-
able inferences in probate litigation. However, in the light of 
subsequent cases concerning the effect of circumstantial evidence 
which supports conflicting inferences, it seems that the rule set 
out in the Farr case has had no effect on litigation in other phases 
of the law.25 Another distinguishing factor in the Farr case 
may have been that the Supreme Court was passing upon the 
validity of an instruction which the trial court had given to the 
jury rather than upon the question of whether the judge had a 
duty to direct a verdict. However, the distinction does not appear 
to be material, because when the supreme court approves an in-
struction to the jury, the implication is that it has already ap-
proved the submission of the case to the jury. 
The Supreme Court of Nebraska has recognized the differ-
ence between the burden of proof necessary to sustain a plain-
tiff's case by circumstantial evidence in criminal and civil pro-
ceedings. In O'Connor v. State26 the defendant was charged with 
the criminal offense of uttering a false will. Proof of the charge 
was based entirely on circumstantial evidence which did not lead 
to a conclusive inference of guilt. This criminal case was the re-
sult of the civil case of In re O'Connor's Estate27 in which the 
supreme court said that it was error to admit the will to probate, 
basing its decision on substantially the same evidence presented 
in the subsequent criminal case. The court said in the criminal 
case: 
Being a civil case [In re O'Connor's Estate] this question turned 
on the preponderance of evidence alone, and did not require proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt as is required in such prosecution as 
this ... When it is sought to establish the guilt of the accused in 
24' Id. at 618, 622. 
!!G The court did not follow the rule in the Farr case in a subsequent 
probate case, In re Bingaman's Estate, 155 Neb. 24, 50 N.W.2d 523 (1951). 
The action, however, was to determine the validity of a contract between 
the deceased and the plaintiff and not the validity of the will. However, 
the policy factors which favor the contestant in each case appear to be 
about the same. 
21.l 110 Neb. 822, 195 N.W. 125 (1923). 
27105 Neb. 88, 179 N.W. 401; Note, 12 A.L.R. 199 (1920). 
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a criminal case by circumstantial evidence, it is not sufficient 
that the facts create a probability though a strong one. If, there-
fore, assuming all the facts to be true which the evidence tends 
to establish, they may yet be accounted for upon any hypothesis 
which does not include the guilt of the accused, the proof fails.2s 
109 
The case presents an excellent comparison of the different 
burdens necessary for a plaintiff to substantiate his position in 
criminal and civil proceedings when the proof depends almost 
entirely upon circumstantial evidence. However, the effect of 
these two cases may be limited since they involve probate of wills. 
In determining the civil cases which adopt the criminal law 
rule that the plaintiff must present an inference that excludes 
every other reasonable inference, the Nebraska Supreme Court 
does not discuss the policy behind the decisions but merely cites 
previous cases reaching the same conclusion.29 The rule appears 
to have been originally adopted from Iowa cases.30 However. 
recently Iowa has deviated from the stringent requirements of the 
rule.31 One court commented that it did not think the Iowa court 
fully understood the rule.32 Other jurisdictions have also cited 
the rule that the plaintiff must present a reasonable inference, 
theory, or hypothesis to the exclusion of evel'Y other inference, 
theory, or hypothesis.33 
2s 110 Neb. at 828, 829; 195 N.W. at 127. 
29 See Bedford v. Herman, 158 Neb. 400, 63 N.W.2d 772 (1954); Sham-
blen v. Great Lakes Pipe Line Co., 158 Neb. 752, 64 N.W.2d 728 (1954); 
Ulrich v. Batchelder, 143 Neb. 697, 10 N.W.2d 637 (1943); Jones v. 
Union Pac. Ry., 141 Neb 112, 2 N.W.2d 624 (1942); Bixby v. Ayers, 
139 Neb. 652, 298 N.W. 533 (1941); Anderson v. Interstate Transit Lines, 
129 Neb. 612, 262 N.W. 445 (1935); Katskee v. City of Omaha, 110 Neb. 
380, 193 N.W. 752 (1923); Blid v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 89 Neb. 689, 131 
N.W. 1027 (1911). 
30 Blid v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 89 Neb. 689, 131 N.W. 1027 (1911) 
appears to be the first Nebraska case stating the rule. It merely cited 
the conclusion and gave as authority Asbach v. Chicago B. & Q. Ry., 74 
Iowa 248, 37 N.W. 182 (1888). 
31 Haverly v. Union Const. Co., 236 Iowa 278, 18 N.W.2d 629 (1945); 
Central Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lederer Strauss & Co., 236 Iowa 16, 17 
N.W.2d 817 ( 1945). In both cases the Iowa court said that the inference 
drawn from the circumstantial evidence need not be the only possible 
inference, but must be merely the most probable inference that can be 
drawn from the facts. 
32 Northwest States Utilities Co. v. Ashton, 51 Wyo. 158, 65 P.2d 235, 
239 (1937). 
33 Christie v. Callahan, 124 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1941) Wagner v. Somer-
set County Mero. Park, 372 Pa. 338, 93 A.2d 440 (1953); Boyce Motor 
Lines Inc. v. State, 280 App. Div. 693, 117 N.Y.S.2d 289 (3d Dep't 1952); 
Sturgeon v. Quarton, 316 Ill. App. 308, 44 N.E.2d 766 (1942); McGill Y. 
Walnut Realty Co., 148 S.W.2d 131 (1\Io. App. 1941); Erickson v. Todd, 
62 S.D. 280, 252 N.W. 879 (1934). 
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However, the rule is by no means universally accepted. Au-
thorities are in conflict as to what the correct rule should be, and 
the argument has been made that they do not actually conflict.34 
The "beyond a reasonable doubt rule" has been rejected by many 
jurisdictions. The rejection of the rule takes two forms. Some 
courts say that more than one reasonable inference is possible and 
the plaintiff merely needs to present an inference that sustains 
his burden of proving liability a preponderance of the evidence.3;; 
These decisions specifically repudiate the opposite rule, which the 
courts refer to as the criminal law rule. The other cases reject 
the rule indirectly by holding that the plaintiff has the burden 
of proving his case by a preponderance of the evidence, even 
though his case is based on circumstantial evidence, and he sus-
tains this burden by presenting the most reasonable inference or a 
reasonable inference.36 
Examination of the facts in the Koutsky, Shamblen, and Bed-
ford cases may well lead to the conclusion that the decisions were 
proper on the merits. However, the Court's language and rea-
soning cause confusion. In the Koutsky case it would have been 
sufficient if the court had said that the circumstantial evidence 
presented a reasonable inference and the jury should have been 
34 Jones dealt with the problem in two different works an evidence and 
cited opposing rules. He said in Jones, Commentaries On Evidence 23 
(1926), "In a civil case, circumstantial evidence need not exclude every 
reasonable conclusion other than that arrived at by the jury." In the note 
scpporting this conclusion, the author cites cases which hold that the in-
ference must exclude eyery other reasonable inference and says that this 
theory does not really conflict because if the probabilities are equal there 
is no preponderance of evidence and the burden of proof has not been 
sustained. However, in his later work, Jones, Evidence, Civil Cases 1680 
I 1944) the author cites the rule that the eYidence supporting the plaintiff's 
theory cannot be inconsistent with any other rational theory and cites the 
same cases cited in the previous work to substantiate that conclusion. In 9 
Wigmore, Evidence § 2498 (3d ed. 1940), the author discusses the prob-
lem and decides that the criminal law rule only applies in civil cases when 
a criminal act is charged. 
3G Richardson v. Butler, 206 Okla. 79, 240 P.2d 1058 (1952); Booker 
Y. Kansas Power & Light Co., 167 Kan. 322, 205 P.2d 984 (1949); John-
son v. Ely, 30 Tenn. App. 294, 205 S.W.2d 759 (1947); Leek v. New 
South Express Lines, 192 S.C. 527, 7 S.E.2d 459 (1940); Northwest States 
Utilities Co. v. Ashton, 51 Wyo. 168, 65 P.2d 235 (1937); King v. Weis-
Patterson Lumber Co. 124 Fla. 272, 168 So. 858 (1936). 
3G Schultz v. Henry Vaughans Sons & Co., 24 N.J. Super. 492, 94 .A.2d 
873 (1953); Manteuffel Y. Theo. Hamm Brewing Co., 56 N.W.2d 310 
(Minn. 1952); Patton Y. Ballam, 115 Vt. 308, 58 A.2d 817 (1948); 
Vaccarezza v. Sanguinetti, 71 Cal. App.2d 687, 163 P.2d 470 (1946); 
Cox Y. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 139 Me. 167, 28 A.2d 143 (1942); Ex-
change Bank Y. Occident Elevator Co., 95 Mont. 78, 24 P.2d 126 (1933). 
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allowed to determine whether it was sufficient to allow recovery. 
In the Shamblen and the Bedford cases the court could have said 
that the evidence presented by the plaintiff did not lead to a rea-
sonable inference or that the plaintiff's evidence was merely sus-
picion and conjecture and therefore the plaintiff did not satisfy 
the burden of proof necessary to get to the jury.3 i 
This standard would have allowed the trial court to reach 
the same results and would have resulted in a clearer standard 
for future application. Consequently, it would have solved the 
two major conflicting policy problems--consistency of i·esults and 
justice in individual cases. 
Despite the fact that most of the Nebraska cases hold that 
the plaintiff must prove his case by a reasonable inference that 
excludes every other reasonable inference,38 the Nebraska Su-
preme Court would not be reversing overwhelming previous Ne-
braska case authority if it adopted the most reasonable inference 
theory or the preponderance of the evidence theory. The reasons 
for this conclusion are twofold: (1) The Nebraska court has 
never made a complete discussion of the two theories, and (2) 
the Farr39 case can be used as authority for the proposition that 
circumstantial evidence leading to more than one reasonable in-
ference should be allowed to reach the jury. Moreover, the 
United States District Court for Nebraska has expressed doubt 
as to which rule would be applicable in this jurisdiction:10 
CONCLUSION 
In deciding whether a directed verdict is proper in a case in 
which the plaintiff depends upon cirmustantial evidence, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court appears to be setting a standard which 
requires the plaintiff to satisfy a higher burden of proof than the 
civil law ordinarily requires. The present state of the law also 
37 The Nebraska court has consistently held that verdicts will not be 
allowed to rest on conjecture, possibility, or unsupported probability. 
McCullough v. Omaha Coliseum Corp., 144 Neb. 92, 12 N.W.2d 639 (1944); 
Bowerman v. Greenberg, 142 Neb. 721, 7 N.W.2d 711 (1943); Bowers v. 
Kugler, 140 Neb. 684, 1 N.W.2d 299 (1941); Painter v. Chicago B. & Q. 
Ry., 93 Neb. 419, 140 N.W. 787 (1913). 
38 Supra note 29. 
39 In re Farr's Estate, 150 Neb. 615, 35 N.W.2d 489 (1949). 
40 The United District Court for Nebraska recognized the split of au-
thority between the "criminal law rule" and what it termed the "more 
liberal" preponderance of evidence rule. However, the court did not base 
its decision on a distinction between the two rules. It merely said that 
the plaintiff did not sustain his burden of proof by reliance on either rule. 
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Independent Metal Products Co., 99 F. Supp. 862, 
867 (D. Neb. 1951), aff'd 203 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1951). 
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seems to leave trial judges in considerable confusion as to just 
what standards should be followed. It is submitted that a work-
able standard would call for a directed verdict where the party 
having the affirmative does not present by circumstantial evi-
dence a reasonable inference that would satisfy the requirement 
that he must sustain his case by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Therefore, if the inference created by the circumstantial evidence 
is the most reasonable inference to the jury from all those in-
ferences which might be drawn, and the jury determines that the 
preponderance of the evidence is in favor of such inference, then 
the jury should be permitted to determine the case accordingly. 
This appears to be the most workable solution to the problem and 
is consistent with standard rules on burden of proof in civil cases. 
Robert Berkshire, '55 
